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Abstract 
Phishing emails are emails which attempt to solicit sensitive information from unsuspecting 
users. Phishing represents a major threat to information security. To develop interventions 
aimed at reducing phishing susceptibility, an understanding of how emails are evaluated to 
determine their legitimacy, and individual differences that may predict phishing email 
susceptibility is required. The current study aims to examine the relationship between 
phishing susceptibility and time pressure, along with individual differences in cue utilisation 
and information security awareness (ISA). In an online study, 127 participants were randomly 
assigned to either a 7-second or 15-second time condition and were presented with 60 emails 
(40 genuine and 20 phishing). Emails were presented one at a time for the duration 
corresponding with each participant’s time condition. Participants were required to sort each 
email into one of ten categories. The ‘phishing’ category was considered a hit when chosen 
following a phishing email, and a false alarm when following a genuine email. Participants 
also completed an assessment of cue utilisation in the domain of phishing, and the Human 
Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q). Statistical analyses revealed that a 
higher level of cue utilisation, a shorter email exposure duration and higher ISA resulted in 
reduced ability to differentiate between phishing and genuine emails. Furthermore, a positive 
correlation was found between cue utilisation and ISA, however, there was no interaction 
between time pressure and cue utilisation on phishing susceptibility. This study’s outcomes 







INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY viii 
 
Declaration 
“This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree 
of diploma in any University, and, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis contains no 
material previously published except where due reference is made. I give permission for the 
digital version of this thesis to be made available on the web, via the University of Adelaide’s 
digital thesis repository, the Library Search and through web search engines, unless 





INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY ix 
 
Contribution Statement 
For this thesis, I collaborated with another honours student when creating the email stimuli, 
but different aspects of the project and different research questions were addressed. In writing 
this thesis, my supervisors, the other honours student, and I collaborated to generate research 
questions of interest and design the appropriate methodology. The other student and I 
completed the ethics application, then selected and recreated all 60 emails used within the 
email management task. I, alone, created the email management task on the Qualtrics 
platform and inserted the appropriate pre-existing questionnaires (HAIS-Q and EXPERTise 
2.0). I was responsible for all participant recruitment and testing, and I allocated credit to 
students upon the studies completion, while my supervisors provided all participation 
incentives for the public. I, alone; collected, collated, and formatted all data that was retrieved 
from the experiment and reported in this thesis. My supervisors and I collaborated to analyse 
the data using SPSS. I wrote up all aspects of the thesis.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY x 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisors Jaime Auton and Daniel Sturman, you have both 
been incredibly supportive to me this year. I could always expect prompt email responses 
filled with great advice, I have learnt a lot from you both and I am grateful for the time you 
have given me. 
I also would like to thank fellow honours student Tazin Tanvir, who I worked closely 
with when creating the experiment, it was great to have someone to bounce ideas off. 
Finally, I thank my family and friends who have further supported me through the 
writing of this thesis, giving me motivation when I needed it most. 
 
Running Head: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY  1 
 
The Role of Time Pressure, Cue Utilisation, and Information Security Awareness on Phishing 
Email Susceptibility 
Phishing refers to a type of cyber-attack that derives its name from its aim; to ‘phish’ 
for sensitive information. Phishing attacks take many forms, with the most common method 
being an email disguised as legitimate to fool recipients into clicking on a malicious link or 
attachment (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 2020a; Luo, Zhang, Burd, & 
Seazzu, 2013). Phishing attacks usually target a large group of people at once, where the 
objective is to gather personal details, login credentials or gain access to a computer system 
(Luo et al., 2013; Parsons, Butavicius, Delfabbro, & Lillie, 2019; Xu & Zhang, 2012).  
Phishing has been identified as one of the greatest threats to organisational 
information security (Parsons et al., 2019). Between 2014 and 2018 cyber-attacks to 
businesses increased by 67% (Biselle, LaSalle, & Dal Cin, 2017), and phishing was the top 
form of scam reported to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission in 2019 
(Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 2020b). The estimated loss to Australian 
individuals from those reported phishing attacks was over $1.5 million, and in 2020 the 
number of phishing reports for January-April is almost half the number of reports for the 
entirety of 2019 (Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 2020a; 2020c). In 
addition to financial loss, phishing attacks can cause negative psychological effects, as 
phishing victims have indicated feelings of embarrassment, anger, devastation, and sadness 
(Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2018). They also experienced reduced feelings of safety online, reduced 
trust in themselves and others, and physical symptoms including sleepless nights (Jansen & 
Leukfeldt, 2018).  
In recent years, as technology has become more sophisticated and internet usage has 
grown, phishing attacks have also increased in frequency and sophistication making them 
increasingly difficult to detect (Australian Cyber Security Centre, 2020; Vishwanath, Herath, 
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Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011; Xu & Zhang, 2012). Contemporary email applications and 
internet browsers have begun implementing technological solutions to prevent potential 
phishing emails being passed on to users. For example, many email applications have email-
filtering technology installed automatically filtering out suspected phishing emails (Luo et al., 
2013; Xu & Zhang, 2012). While such technologies are an extremely useful barrier to 
phishing emails, they are not infallible. As such, technological solutions alone cannot provide 
adequate safeguards against ever evolving phishing attacks (McCormac et al., 2018; 
Vishwanath et al., 2011).  
Phishing emails rely on human error to succeed, as their content oftentimes aims to 
exploit cognitive weaknesses and biases (Ferreira & Teles, 2019; Parsons et al., 2019; 
Vishwanath et al., 2011). This can be illustrated in a study conducted by IBM, where it was 
found over 95% of security breaches were due to human error (IBM, 2015). Therefore, as 
human users are the last defense against phishing attacks, a greater understanding of 
individual differences that may increase phishing email susceptibility is warranted. Thus, 
psychologists endeavour to determine how best to minimise errors in email judgement to gain 
a greater understanding of individual differences influencing phishing susceptibility 
(Vishwanath et al., 2011).  
Individual Differences and Phishing Email Susceptibility 
Phishing emails originated in 1995 (Rekouche, 2011) and were first observed in 
Australia in 2003 (Australian Cyber Security Centre, 2020), therefore, phishing literature is a 
relatively new field of research. To gain understanding of their influence on phishing 
susceptibility, the phishing literature has typically focused on demographic information such 
as computer-usage, gender and age (Moody, Galletta, & Dunn, 2017; Sheng, Holbrook, 
Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). This literature has produced inconsistent findings. 
For instance, some researchers found females were more susceptible to phishing emails, 
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compared to males (e.g., Halevi, Lewis, & Memon, 2013; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & 
Menczer, 2007; Sheng et al., 2010), while several studies found no difference in phishing 
susceptibility between genders (e.g., Butavicius et al., 2017; Parsons et al., 2019). 
Additionally, studies have demonstrated phishing susceptibility decreases with age (Parsons 
et al., 2019; Sheng et al., 2010), while others have found age to have no effect (Moody et al., 
2017). Similarly, some researchers have shown possessing a higher familiarity with 
computers resulted in increased ability to detect phishing emails (Parsons et al., 2019), while 
others found increased frequency of internet usage was associated with a higher likelihood to 
click on phishing email links (Moody et al., 2017).  
These inconsistent findings demonstrate it is unknown which individual differences 
reliably influence phishing susceptibility. Therefore, further research is required to solidify 
these relationships, or to identify alternative individual differences that may demonstrate an 
increased effect. Potential alternative differences include cue utilisation, information security 
awareness and decision-making processes, which are yet to be investigated and may arguably 
influence an individual’s ability to detect phishing emails.  
Cues  
When determining email legitimacy, effective decision-making relies on an accurate 
and timely evaluation of the email (Klein, 2008), which is facilitated by feature-event/object 
associations stored in memory, known as cues (Wiggins, 2014a; 2014b). For example, in a 
situation wherein an individual aims to determine whether an email is legitimate or phishing, 
the presence of certain features (e.g., spelling/grammar mistake or unrecognised URL) are 
associated with an event (whether said email is phishing or legitimate). These specialised 
associations are formed through repeated application to become a cue, which, when 
encountered, is retrieved from long-term memory, and activated (Brunswik, 1955; Wiggins, 
2014a).  
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Every situation is comprised of unique features that can become cues which inform 
appropriate situational behaviour (Brouwers, Wiggins, Helton, O’Hare & Griffin, 2016). 
Cues function to increase the ease with which a decision can be made and implemented, 
enabling rapid recognition and response to a situation with minimal cognitive effort 
(Brouwers et al., 2016; Brunswick, 1955; Wiggins, 2014a). Depending on the stimulus 
complexity, multiple cues can be activated at once at the unconscious level of information 
processing (Wiggins, 2014a).  
Cues commonly associated with phishing emails include links or senders addresses 
that do not appear legitimate, along with spelling/grammar errors (Parsons, et al., 2015). 
Brunswik’s (1955) Lens Model attempts to explain how individuals make judgements using 
cues in a variety of situations. The Lens Model (Figure 1) can be applied to decision making 
in a phishing context, wherein the ‘true state’ represents whether the email is legitimate or 
phishing, and the ‘judged state’ represents whether an individual thinks the email is 
legitimate or phishing.  
When observing a phishing email, several cues will be available (spelling/grammar 
mistake, unrecognised URL etc.), all differently weighted regarding how diagnostic they are 
of the event (the email is phishing). To aid their decision, an individual could choose to use 
any of these cues. Therefore, if fewer diagnostic cues are used, their judgement accuracy may 
be reduced, thus concluding the email is not phishing. Consequently, in such a case where the 
individual’s ‘judged’ and ‘true’ state differ, they will have an increased likelihood of falling 
victim to phishing compared to individuals whose states correlate and, therefore, more 
effectively judge phishing emails. Judgement was based on this lens of information (cues) to 
determine whether an email is legitimate or not (Parsons et al., 2015; Wang, Herath, Chen, 
Vishwanath, & Rao, 2012).  
 












Figure 1: The Lens Model  
 
Cue Utilisation. When assessing situations, everyone has a different inherent 
capability to extract key environmental features and form cues, and may possess a different 
level of necessary environmental experience for task-related features to become apparent 
(McCormack, Wiggins, Loveday & Festa, 2014; Yuris ,Wiggins, Auton, Gaicon, & Sturman, 
2019). Additionally, individuals differ in propensity to acquire patterns that make up cues 
(Brouwers, Wiggins & Griffin, 2018) and cue-based decision making is prone to errors that 
delay or prevent accurate recognition of the event/object (Brouwers et al., 2018). This 
differing capacity to identify and apply cues is known as cue utilisation and is thought to be a 
key individual difference influencing individuals’ ability to discriminate between genuine and 
phishing emails. 
A higher capacity for cue utilisation depends on several factors, firstly, capacity to 
identify task-related features from an assortment of features (e.g., an environmental scene; 
Wiggins, 2014b). Furthermore, it is necessary to understand how different features and 
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events/objects constituting an operating environment are related and a capacity to 
discriminate between the relevance of different cues in solving the situation-specific problem 
(Wiggins, 2014b). Finally, cue utilisation is reliant on a capacity to prioritise the acquisition 
of feature information best suited to the resolution of a task-related problem (Wiggins, 
2014b).  
Cue utilisation has been found to differentiate more-effective from less-effective 
operators in a variety of contexts. During a novel train control task, lower levels of cue 
utilisation resulted in significantly greater response latency and significantly lower accuracy 
than higher levels of cue utilisation (Brouwers et al., 2016). This indicates participants’ 
effectiveness and efficiency in recognising cues was influenced by their cue utilisation level 
(Brouwers et al., 2016). Furthermore, during a simulated driving task, participants with 
higher cue utilisation experienced significantly fewer errors, collisions, fixations, and visual 
saccades compared to those with lower levels of cue utilisation (Yuris et al., 2019). This 
result occurred despite completing the task at a faster mean rate, indicating environmental 
cues were identified and applied with higher efficiency and effectiveness (Yuris et al. 2019).  
To date, one study has examined the relationship between phishing detection and cue 
utilisation, wherein higher cue utilisation resulted in improved identification of phishing 
features within emails, compared to lower cue utilisation (Bayl-Smith, Sturman & Wiggins, 
2020). However, this improved ability to identify phishing features did not translate to an 
improved ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails (Bayl-Smith et al., 
2020). The researchers indicated this may have been due to the study’s small email sample (5 
phishing, 5 genuine), containing multiple phishing features and consequently being too easy 
to detect (Bayl-Smith et al., 2020). Furthermore, these did not operate as a real email would, 
they were merely images (e.g., no ability to hover-over hyperlinks to reveal more 
information), and had no personal import to participants’, therefore, reducing motivation 
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(Bayl-Smith et al., 2020). This small email sample reduced the studies statistical power, 
increasing likelihood of type II errors, additionally, lack of sophistication within the emails 
and the ease with which they could be detected may have reduced ecological validity. Future 
research could remedy these issues with a larger sample of more sophisticated emails, 
resembling and operating more closely to real emails, representing a wider variety of subject 
types, and email formats.  
Modes of Decision Making  
When making decisions, individuals may differ in how they assess situation-related 
information. According to dual processing theory, in a decision-making situation such as 
evaluating an email for legitimacy, two processing systems are accessed: system 1 and 
system 2 (Kahneman, 2003). Processing within these two systems is distinct from one 
another; system 1 constitutes fast and effortless processing, utilising automatic heuristics such 
as environmental cues to allow for efficient decision making (Kahneman, 2003). While 
system 2 processing is slow, controlled, and effortful, and has been linked to choices 
determined by considering consequences of actions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 
2003), such as when evaluating an email for legitimacy. 
Most behaviour will use system 1 processing, and system 2 will provide intervention 
when difficulty, novelty, and motivation combine to command mental resources and consider 
an alternate decision (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Arguably, in a typical situation when 
answering emails, a computer-user will use system 1 processing. This may be due to the need 
for quick decision making when answering many commonplace emails received daily. 
Regular cues may be identified and accessed within these predictable emails, and the 
appropriate situational action becomes apparent. However, if the email appears abnormal due 
to the presence of a potential phishing cue, or is entirely new, assessment difficulty and 
novelty may increase, motivating the computer-user to access system 2’s deliberative 
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processes. In such a case, the email is effortfully observed, and intuitions suggested initially 
by system 1 will be reflected upon to come to a decision (Chowdhury, Adam & Skinner, 
2019). However, situational factors could interrupt this process, such as time pressure, 
therefore, necessitating a decision to be made before this process can complete, increasing 
reliance on system 1 (Chowdhury et al., 2019). 
The Effect of Time Constraints on Decision Making. Time-pressure has been 
identified as a structural influence affecting the decision mode used in a situation (Allen, 
2011). Previous research suggests, under time pressure, decision makers increase their 
decision speed, or switch to simpler strategies (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that time pressure results in reliance on intuition (system 1) as a surrogate for 
exhaustive search strategies (system 2) (Allen, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2019). For example, 
if an individual is about to have a collision while driving, they are under time pressure to 
avoid catastrophe. Therefore, they are far more likely to engage in quick system 1 processing, 
rather than slower system 2 processing. (Kahneman, 2003).  
Individuals have reported increasingly experiencing time pressure in their 
professional and personal lives as they are loaded with multiple tasks and aim to meet 
deadlines (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Oftentimes, such time pressure is generated when 
answering emails, as many may be received daily coupled with an expectation of a prompt 
response. A higher email load has been linked to an increased likelihood to respond to 
phishing emails (Vishwanath et al., 2011). Furthermore, habitual media use, which results in 
automatic responses to patterned stimuli, has been linked to phishing susceptibility 
(Vishwanath et al., 2011). This illustrates that increased reliance on quick cue-based system 1 
decisions, resulting from time pressure, could increase phishing susceptibility. If every email 
was verified with system 2 processing, time pressure would compound, as the act of verifying 
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security cues in emails has been identified as a task that generates time pressure (Chowdhury 
et al., 2019).  
In a systematic review examining time pressure’s effect on various cybersecurity 
activities, two studies examined phishing (Chowdhury et al., 2019). These studies looked at 
participants’ responses to time pressure implied through urgency cues in emails (Chowdhury 
et al., 2019). Both demonstrated when email content implied urgency, participants were more 
likely to respond to the phishing email (Marett & Wright, 2009; Wang et al., 2012). However, 
neither study directly applied time-pressure to participants when they were viewing the 
emails.  
 In Chowdhury et al.’s (2019) review, of the studies that did not examine phishing, 
four explicitly measured time pressure, as participants had a certain amount of time in which 
the task was to be completed. Only one compared a low and high time pressure condition, in 
this case, low time pressure participants completed 91% of the tasks, while participants’ 
under high time pressure only completed 74% of tasks (Chowdhury et al., 2019; McNab, 
Hess, & Valacich, 2009). Additionally, time pressure was compared to no-time-pressure in 
three studies. In all three cases, time pressure was implied, and not explicit, and led to a non-
secure information security behaviour (Chowdhury et al., 2019). These results demonstrate, 
compared with lesser or no time pressure, higher levels of time pressure reduced performance 
on a variety of cybersecurity tasks. 
This review evidences time pressure increases the likelihood of unsafe information 
security behaviours, but examination of time pressure’s influence on phishing detection is 
lacking. In future research, to ensure time pressure is directly applied to participants, explicit 
time pressure should be enacted by allocating a certain amount of time for responses. This 
will place a guaranteed level of time pressure on participants and allow for direct 
measurement of its effects. Furthermore, varying time pressure conditions are necessary to 
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allow for a comparison of performance. This review, along with the effects of time pressure 
on decision making processes, illustrate time pressure may be a determining influence on 
individual’s phishing susceptibility. As email information may be inadequately processed 
thus reducing ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. 
Interaction between cue utilisation and time pressure. Higher levels of cue 
utilisation indicate more effective and efficient identification and accessing of environmental 
cues (Bayl-Smith et al., 2020; Sturman, Wiggins, Auton & Loft, 2019a). Additionally, time 
pressure may change the decision mode, causing increased reliance on system 1 processing, 
which uses cues to facilitate decision making (Allen, 2011; Kahneman, 2003). Consequently, 
under time pressure, individuals with relatively higher levels of cue utilisation should be able 
to more efficiently assess and act upon cues. While those with relatively lower levels of cue 
utilisation will attempt the same process, with lower efficiency, resulting in poorer 
discrimination between phishing and genuine emails. However, with reduced time pressure, 
individuals should have sufficient time to recognise important features in phishing emails 
regardless of their level of cue utilisation. Consequently, with reduced time pressure, cue 
utilisation is likely to have less impact on phishing email detection.  
Information Security Awareness  
Information security awareness (ISA) is the extent to which people understand safe 
information security behaviours, and extent to which individuals are committed to, and 
behave in accordance with, best practice of these behaviours (Parsons et al., 2017). This 
difference may influence phishing detection, as information security refers to processes and 
methodologies designed to protect information or data from unauthorized access (SANS, 
2020). Therefore, phishing is an information security issue, as phishers aim to obtain 
information illegally. ISA serves as an operationalisation of individuals’ cyber-risk beliefs, 
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allowing insight into knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour regarding email-use (Parsons et al., 
2017). 
Individuals’ beliefs are formed through prior experience, exposure to media and other 
internal factors (Bandura, 1989). Additionally, when situational actions are considered, the 
most readily accessed cognitions are previously held beliefs corresponding with that situation 
(e.g., consideration of risk-related actions correspond with risk-related beliefs; Griffin, 
Neuwirth, Giese & Dunwoody, 2002). These beliefs were formed previously, and when a 
similar situation arose, they were accessed and applied. Therefore, when assessing an email 
and considering the next action, individuals will access previously established cyber-risk 
beliefs. 
It is likely an individual with higher ISA will indicate better knowledge, attitude, and 
behaviour towards email-related information security issues. These cyber-risk beliefs have 
been previously established (Bandura, 1989) and, due to higher ISA, are better understood. 
Consequently, individuals with a higher ISA more readily consider related risks (Griffin et 
al., 2002), resulting in safer email-related information security behaviours than those with 
lower ISA. Previous research has found employee’s ISA is vital in mitigating risks associated 
with information security breaches (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Sohrabi Safa, Von Solms & 
Furnell, 2016). Additionally, higher ISA has been found to correlate with an improved ability 
to detect illegitimate email links (Parsons et al., 2017), however, whether this translates to 
other phishing cues is yet to be examined. 
ISA represents knowledge, attitude, and behaviour towards information security, 
measured using a self-report. To develop cues that identify an email as phishing, some 
knowledge of potential phishing features is necessary, therefore, some degree of ISA is 
required to identify such features. Cues will develop through exposure to information security 
environments, and increased exposure may result in increased understanding of these 
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environments, and therefore, higher ISA. Increased ISA corresponds with safe information 
security behaviours (Parsons et al., 2017), and therefore, may result in better developed cues 
that can be applied with greater effectiveness. Furthermore, while ISA indicates an 
understanding of rules regarding safe information security behaviours, cue utilisation can 
demonstrate this understanding in an operative environment. Therefore, these individual 
differences may be closely related, with one able to predict the other. 
The Current Study 
Aims and Operationalisation. The aim of the current study was to understand how 
time pressure, cue utilisation, and ISA influence the ability to discriminate between phishing 
and genuine emails. Discrimination was measured based on a novel email management task, 
which required participants to view a series of email stimuli, that were either genuine, or had 
a phishing cue inserted into them. These stimuli were presented in two email exposure 
durations (7 secs or 15 secs), and once shown, were required to be sorted into a choice of ten 
possible categories (e.g. Banking, Urgent, Phishing).  
Hypotheses 
H1: It was hypothesised that participants with a relatively higher level of cue 
utilisation would be better able to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, 
compared to those with a relatively lower level of cue utilisation.  
H2: It was hypothesised that participants in the longer email exposure duration would 
be better able to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails, compared to participants 
in the shorter email exposure duration.  
H3: It was hypothesised that differences in ability to discriminate between genuine 
and phishing emails based on cue utilisation will be significantly greater in the shorter 
exposure duration, compared to the longer exposure duration.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY 13 
 
H4: It was hypothesised that higher ISA would be positively associated with 
participants’ ability to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. 
H5: It was hypothesised that participants with a relatively higher level of cue 




One hundred twenty-seven participants were recruited for the experiment (94 
Females, 33 Males), aged between 17 and 54 years (M = 22.10, SD = 7.21), and required to 
be fluent in English. Of these, 109 participants were recruited using the SONA system from 
the pool of first year psychology students at the University of Adelaide. In these cases, 
students received credit upon completion of the study as compensation for their time. 
Eighteen participants were recruited from the public using snowball and convenience 
sampling via social media and word of mouth. As incentive and compensation, these 
participants could enter in a draw to win a $20 gift card.  
Design  
The present study used a 2 x 2 quasi-experimental design, with participants’ ability to 
correctly discriminate phishing from genuine emails serving as the dependent variable. 
Exposure time (7 vs 15 seconds) and cue utilisation typology (higher vs lower) were 
between-subjects independent variables and ISA was included as a continuous covariate.    
Materials 
Demographic Questions. Demographic questions included gender, age (in years), 
and participants’ confidence in using a computer (measured using a Likert scale from 1 [no 
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confidence] to 5 [very confident]). Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate the 
approximate number of emails received per day and time spent on the computer each day.  
Email Management Task. The Qualtrics platform was used to create and host this 
online task, in which participants are told to roleplay as personal assistant to “Professor Alex 
Jones”. They are tasked with examining emails sent to his inbox and sorting them into one of 
ten categories. Before commencing the task, participants are given instructions; along with an 
image demonstrating how to hover-over links in the stimuli.   
The email management task consists of 60 emails (see Appendix A). Emails 
replicated genuine non-phishing emails previously received by the researchers, representing a 
mix of personal and work-related emails. Emails contained between 15 and 100 words; this 
upper limit was chosen to ensure participants were able to adequately assess each email 
within the given time. Emails were selected to contain a balance of Cialdini’s (2009) 
persuasion strategies. These strategies aim to place a perceived pressure on the reader through 
the email’s writing and content. Twelve emails contained the authority persuasion strategy, 
12 contained the scarcity persuasion strategy, 12 contained the reciprocity persuasion 
strategy, 12 contained the social proof persuasion strategy and 12 contained no persuasion 
strategy. This was chosen to remain consistent with emails received in a typical inbox, as 
both genuine and phishing emails usually contain persuasion strategies (Parsons et al., 2019). 
All emails contained a URL. In 17 stimuli this URL was displayed in the body of the email, 
while in 43 stimuli, the URL was embedded in a prompt button (e.g., “CLICK HERE”). In 
the latter case, the mouse could be used to hover-over the prompt button and display said 
URL (see Appendix B). In either instance it was ensured each stimulus remained consistent 
with the email serving as its basis.  
Of the 60 emails, 20 were converted into phishing emails by inserting phishing cues. 
The stimuli were randomly assigned into one of four phishing conditions, determining which 
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phishing cue was embedded. Five emails included one spelling and one grammar mistake 
inserted within the first two lines of text to maintain consistency. Furthermore, five emails 
included a phishing sender’s address, five included a phishing URL and five included all 
three of these (see Appendix A). These features were balanced across persuasion strategies 
and were selected to best emulate the range of phishing cues present in real world phishing 
emails, and to be of equal salience. Each phishing URL and phishing senders address used 
was a genuine example, found online or within a real phishing email received by the 
researchers. 
Participants were presented with all 60 stimuli for either 7 seconds or 15 seconds 
depending on the allocated email exposure duration. When viewing each email, a count-down 
timer was displayed, indicating the time remaining in which they could view the email. This 
manipulation allowed effects of the email exposure duration to be directly observed and for 
comparison of these durations. Following each presentation, the stimulus was removed, and 
participants were asked to categorise the email. This categorisation question contained ten 
options, aiming to obfuscate the “phishing” option, and reduce the chance of any priming 
effects. These options were urgent, teaching, research, banking, online purchases, social 
media accounts, official, spam, phishing and miscellaneous. Each was paired with a 
description, informing participants of email types which should be sorted into the respective 
category (see Appendix C). If the phishing option was chosen after viewing a stimulus with a 
phishing cue, this was considered a hit. Choosing any other option after the presentation of a 
phishing stimulus was considered a miss. Genuine stimuli (no phishing cue present) sorted 
into the phishing category were considered a false alarm, and genuine stimuli classified as 
any other option was a correct rejection. This process was completed for all 60 stimuli, and 
the task was estimated to take between 30-60 minutes. 
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The study’s description informed participants that the study would be investigating 
“User Behaviour and the Management of Emails”. Consequently, participants were 
misinformed about the study’s true nature, ensuring they were unaware the experiment 
related to phishing email detection. This approach was chosen to avoid any subject 
expectancy bias and priming effects (Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, & Butavicius, 2015). 
Past research has found that if participants are aware a study is phishing-related they act 
unnaturally, resulting in an increase in false alarms (identifying genuine emails as phishing; 
Lawson, Zielinska, Pearson, & Mayhorn, 2017; Parsons et al., 2015).  
Pilot Study  
A pilot study was run to assist in determining the time (in seconds) allocated to the 
shorter and longer time condition in the main study. This was achieved by examining the 
confidence rating that participants gave their email categorisation decision, along with 
performance on the task. The confidence rating was made on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 
(not confident) to 5 (very confident), while performance was measured using the same 
methodology as the main study.  
Twenty participants were recruited using the SONA system from the pool of 
University of Adelaide first-year psychology students (15 females, 4 males, 1 other).  
Participants who completed the pilot study were excluded from completing the main study. 
This pilot study was conducted prior to the main study, and the email management task used 
the same 60 stimuli used in the main study. These stimuli were allocated into one of four time 
conditions (5, 7, 10 and 15 seconds), resulting in 15 stimuli in each condition. Each condition 
contained 10 genuine emails and five phishing emails. Phishing features were consistent with 
the main study (spelling/grammar mistake, phishing senders address, phishing URL and all 
three), and were evenly distributed across time conditions. The pilot study used a within-
subjects design, whereby participants viewed all 60 emails and therefore experienced all time 
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conditions. Consistent with the main study, participants experienced the same role-playing 
scenario and were informed the task was investigating “User Behaviour and the Management 
of Emails”.  
The results indicated performance in the 5 second condition was no better than 
chance, and the categorisation decision was consistently made with low confidence. 
Performance in the 7 second condition was above chance, and rating confidence was 
moderate, and therefore 7 seconds was selected as the duration for the shorter time condition, 
and to maximise the difference between the two conditions, 15 seconds was selected to be the 
longer time condition. 
 Human Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q). To measure 
participant’s ISA, the present study used the Human Aspects of Information Security 
Questionnaire (HAIS-Q; Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, & Jerram, 2014). This 
intends to capture individuals’ knowledge, attitude, and behaviour regarding information 
security (Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius, & Jerram, 2013). Underpinning this 
measure is the Knowledge-Attitude-Behaviour (KAB) Model (Baranowski, Cullen, Nicklas, 
Thompson, & Baranowski, 2003), which had been previously established in an information 
security context (Kruger & Kearny, 2006). This model was decided upon due to a hypothesis 
formed from results of interviews with a company’s management, and an exploratory survey 
completed by 203 employees of the same company (Parsons et al., 2013). This hypothesis 
posited that as computer users’ knowledge of information security policy and procedure rises, 
attitudes will improve, resulting in improved information security behaviours (Parsons et al., 
2017).  
The HAIS-Q centres around 7 focus areas; internet use, email use, social networking 
site use, password management, incident reporting, information handling and mobile 
computing (Parsons et al., 2014; 2017). These focus areas were decided using results from 
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the previously mentioned interviews and survey (Parsons et al., 2013), and reviews of 
organisational information security policies (Parsons et al., 2014). The resulting focus areas 
were determined to be areas of information security “relevant to employers and computer 
users and most prone to non-compliance” (Parsons et al., 2014). There are three 
representative areas within each focus area, and in each of these is a knowledge, attitude, and 
behaviour statement. 
The email use focus area of the HAIS-Q was solely used in the present study. 
Modular use of the HAIS-Q has been suggested previously, to allow isolation of relevant 
aspects to the specific project (Parsons et al., 2017). The 3 representative areas in the email 
use focus area are, “Clicking on links in emails from known senders”, “Clicking on links in 
emails from unknown senders”, and, “Opening attachments in emails from unknown 
senders”; and each are measured via a separate knowledge, attitude and behaviour statement 
(Parsons et al., 2017). Therefore, the email use subscale used in the present study contains 9 
statements, for example, “it’s risky to open an email attachment from an unknown sender” (of 
these statements, 5 are negatively worded; Parsons et al., 2017). Participants are asked to 
respond to each statement on a five-point Likert scale, from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree). All items within each set of questions, are presented in a fixed random 
order.  
The HAIS-Q has been used on many large groups of working Australians, 
demonstrating its ability to measure ISA (Parsons et al., 2017). A higher score on the email 
use focus area has been found to correlate with improved ability to detect phishing emails 
(Parsons et al., 2017). The HAIS-Q has high internal reliability, evidenced by consistently 
high alpha levels for knowledge, attitude, behaviour, and overall ISA; ranging from .84 to .96 
(McCormac, Calic, Parsons, Zwaans & Butavicius, 2016; McCormac, Calic, et al., 2017a; 
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McCormac, Zwaans, et al., 2017b; Parsons et al., 2014; 2017; Wiley, McCormac & Calic, 
2020).  
Additionally, the measure has shown high test-retest reliability (McCormac et al., 
2016; McCormac, Calic et al., 2017a), and content validity has been established on multiple 
occasions (Calic, Pattinson, Parsons, Butavicius & McCormac, 2016; Pattinson, Butavicius, 
Parsons, McCormac & Jerram, 2015). Convergent validity has been demonstrated, as the 
HAIS-Q was found to correlated with phishing detection, which is a behavioural measure 
expected to correlate with ISA (Parsons et al., 2017). Furthermore, the form of construct 
validity known as ‘known-groups validity’ has been established (Pattinson, Butavicius, 
Parsons, McCormac, Calic & Jerram, 2016). This looks at how the measure is sensitive to 
similarities and differences between groups (Hattie & Cooksey, 1984). The present 
experiment aims to solidify use of the HAIS-Q in a phishing context, and the viability of its 
modular use. 
EXPERT Intensive Skills Evaluation (EXPERTise 2.0) – Phishing Edition. To 
measure cue utilisation, the EXPERT Intensive Skills Evaluation 2.0 (EXPERTise; Wiggins, 
Loveday, & Auton, 2015) phishing edition (Bayl-Smith et al., 2020) was used. This is a 
customisable shell software package able to assess participants’ utilisation of cues during 
task-related activities. EXPERTise has demonstrated good construct validity (Small, Wiggins 
& Loveday, 2014; Wiggins, Azar, Hawken, Loveday & Newman, 2014), predictive validity 
(Watkinson, Bristow, Auton, McMahon & Wiggins, 2018), and test-retest reliability 
(Loveday, Wiggins, Festa, Schell & Twigg, 2013a; Watkinson et al., 2018). EXPERTise has 
been used in varied contexts, including power control (Loveday, Wiggins, Harris, O’Hare & 
Smith, 2013b), aviation decision making (Wiggins et al., 2014) and audiology (Watkinson et 
al., 2018). In the current study, the phishing variant of EXPERTise 2.0 is completed by 
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participants, comprising of four tasks of domain-specific stimuli: The Feature Identification 
Task, Feature Recognition Task, Feature Association Task and Feature Discrimination Task.  
Feature Identification Task (FIT). In the FIT, participants are required to identify 
key features, as quickly as possible, within a complex scene. In the phishing edition, 
participants are presented with 16 scenarios, each consisting of a single phishing email. Using 
a mouse, participants must select the area of the email which they consider the greatest 
concern (e.g., a suspicious URL) as quickly as possible. The first two scenarios are practice 
trials and were not included when calculating mean response times. Participants response 
speed is recorded in milliseconds and mean response latency was determined over the 14 
scenarios. Higher cue utilisation has been associated with lower mean response latency 
(Loveday, Wiggins, & Searle, 2014; Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Talleur, 2017).  
Feature Recognition Task (FRT). In the FRT, participants are presented with 
domain-related stimuli for short periods and then must categorise them. The phishing edition 
has participants view 22 scenarios, 10 with genuine emails, 10 with phishing emails, and two 
practice trials. Each email is presented for 1000ms, after which participants classify the 
emails as “trustworthy”, “untrustworthy” or “impossible to tell”. Participants accuracy was 
summed over the 20 scenarios, greater accuracy is indicative of higher levels of cue 
utilisation (Brouwers et al., 2018; Wiggins & O’Hare, 2003). 
Feature Association Task (FAT). In the FAT, participants are presented with two 
domain-related stimuli, and must rate their perceived relatedness. In the phishing edition, 16 
pairs of words are shown for 1500 milliseconds (e.g. email & task). Using a 7-point Likert 
scale, participants must indicate how related they perceive the words to be, from 1 (extremely 
unrelated) to 7(extremely related). Participants mean variance over mean response time was 
calculated into a single discrimination metric. A greater mean variance to response time is 
indicative of their capacity to rapidly distinguish related from unrelated features and 
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events/objects, and hence, higher cue utilisation (Morrison, Wiggins, Bond, & Tyler, 2013; 
Wiggins et al., 2014). 
Feature Discrimination Task (FDT). In the FDT participants are presented with two 
email scenarios with information relating to a specific problem (e.g. a colleague is expecting 
a delivery). Based on information presented in the email, participants select a course of action 
from a list of four options (e.g. ignore the email).  Following their response, participants are 
provided with a list of features from the scenario and must rate the perceived importance of 
each feature to their decision on a 10-point Likert scale from 1 (Not important at all) to 10 
(Extremely important). Ratings are aggregated to calculate a variance score, whereby greater 
variance is indicative of more discriminant ratings of importance between cues in the 
scenario, and therefore, higher cue utilisation (Loveday et al., 2014; Pauley, O’Hare, & 
Wiggins, 2009; Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). 
Procedure 
Ethics approval was obtained from the subcommittee in the School of Psychology at 
the University of Adelaide (Ref No: 20/39). Participants accessed the link to the online study 
through the SONA system, or through snowball and convenience sampling. Participants read 
the participant information sheet and provided electronic consent, followed by completion of 
the demographic questionnaire. This was followed by random assignment into either the 
shorter (7 seconds) or the longer (15 seconds) time condition, instructions were displayed to 
participants and Email Management Task was completed. Both time conditions viewed the 
same stimuli in the same randomised order. After completing the task, participants completed 
the email-use module of the HAIS-Q and then were redirected to EXPERTise 2.0. The HAIS-
Q and EXPERTise tasks, which focus on phishing emails, were completed after the email 
management task to ensure no priming effects occurred regarding study’s true nature. Once 
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EXPERTise was completed, participants were displayed a message informing them of the 
studies completion.  
Results 
Overview of Analyses 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate whether two individual differences (cue 
utilisation capacity and ISA) and one email characteristic (email exposure duration) affected 
participants’ ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. The data was 
analysed in two stages using IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (Version 26). 
During the first stage, participants were categorised as having a lesser or greater capacity for 
cue utilisation (based on performance in the EXPERTise 2.0 tasks). Second, a discrimination 
score was created based on performance on the Email Management Task, followed by 
examination of the hypotheses with the appropriate statistical tests. 
Data Reduction 
Data from the phishing edition of EXPERTise 2.0 and the Email Management Task 
underwent data reduction. The EXPERTise 2.0 data were used to classify participants into 
cue utilisation typologies reflecting a relatively higher or lower capacity for cue utilisation 
(Sturman et al., 2019a). The data across the four EXPERTise 2.0 tasks were reduced in a 
manner consistent with the standard approach for categorising participants into the two 
typologies (e.g., Brouwers, Wiggins, Griffin, Helton, & O’Hare, 2017; Loveday et al., 
2013b).   
Participants’ performance in the Email Management Task represented one of the 
dependent variables. Data reduction for this task relied on Signal Detection Theory (Green & 
Swets, 1966) to ascertain a discrimination score for each participant. This score represented 
participants’ capacity to discriminate between genuine and phishing emails. It was decided a 
discrimination score would be more appropriate than an alternative that examined only 
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phishing email detection ability. This allowed for a distinction between participants with a 
bias towards cautious behaviour, and those most effective at discriminating between phishing 
and genuine emails. Previous research demonstrates individuals with higher attentional bias 
towards threat-related stimuli mistook genuine links as phishing more often than those with 
less attentional bias towards threats (Falkenberg, Auton, & Parsons, 2019).  
During the Email Management Task, participants categorised 60 emails (20 phishing; 
40 genuine) into one of ten categories (e.g., work, spam, phishing etc.). If participants 
categorised a phishing email correctly into the phishing category, this was considered a hit, 
and if this option was chosen in response to a genuine email, this was considered a false 
alarm. From this, each participants’ hit, and false alarm scores were calculated into a 
proportion score. The proportion of false alarms was subtracted from the proportion of hits, to 
create a discrimination score. For example, if a participant chose the ‘phishing’ option ten 
times in response to phishing emails, this would result in a hit score of ten. This would then 
be divided by the total number of phishing emails (10/20) to create the hit proportion score 
(0.5). This same process would then be completed for the genuine emails, for example, if the 
phishing option was chosen after ten of these, a false alarm score of ten was given. This 
would then be divided by the total number of genuine emails (10/40) to create a false alarm 
proportion score (0.25). These scores would then be subtracted from one another (0.5-0.25 = 
0.25). Discrimination scores can theoretically range between -1 and 1. A discrimination score 
of 0 indicates the individual has no ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails. A negative score indicates an inability to recognise phishing emails and a tendency to 
judge genuine emails as phishing, while a more positive score represents a better 
discrimination ability, with a greater ratio of hits to less false alarms.  
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Data Analysis 
Stage 1: Establishing Typologies. A k-means cluster analysis was conducted to 
determine whether participants could, based on performance in the four tasks, be categorised 
into a higher or lower typology representing relative levels of cue utilisation in the phishing 
domain (Sturman et al., 2019a; Wiggins et al., 2014). Before the cluster analysis could be 
conducted, the scores for each task were converted to z-scores. The cluster analysis using 
these standardised scores yielded two distinct typologies representing relatively higher and 
lower levels of cue utilisation. The higher cue utilisation typology contained 66 participants 
who recorded relatively lower response latencies on the FIT, relatively greater accuracy on 
the FRT, relatively higher mean variance to response latency in the FAT and relatively higher 
mean variance in the FDT. This is the expected pattern of responses for participants who 
possess a higher level of cue utilisation. The remaining 61 participants were classified in the 
lower cue utilisation typology. These participants recorded the opposite pattern of responses 
across the 4 tasks, consistent with performance associated with a lower level of cue 
utilisation. Table 1 summarises the results of the cluster analysis.  
 
Table 1.  
Participant Cluster Means for the EXPERTise 2.0 Measures Across the Two Cue Utilisation 
Typologies.  
 
                        Typology 
EXPERTise 2.0 Tasks  
Higher 
(n = 66) 
Lower 
(n = 61) 
Feature Identification Task (response latency) -.36 .40 
Feature Recognition Task (accuracy) .59 -.67 
Feature Association Task (variance/response latency) .29 -.32 
Feature Discrimination Task (variance) .57 -.61 
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Stage 2: Hypothesis Testing. In the present study, hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 were 
examined using a 2 x 2 between-subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). This ANCOVA 
used cue utilisation (higher, lower) and email exposure duration (shorter, longer) as between-
subjects variables, with ISA as a continuous covariate. These served as the independent 
variables, while the discrimination score of participants served as the dependent variable.  
Examination of histograms revealed the dependent variable was normally distributed 
for each condition, indicating the assumption of normality was met. Levene’s test revealed 
there was no significant difference in each group’s variance, indicating the assumption of 
equal variance was met. The assumption of independence was met by the design of the study, 
with no participant tested twice.  
There was a statistically significant main effect of cue utilisation typology on 
participants’ discrimination scores, F(1, 122) = 19.73, p  < .001, η2 = .14. This result supports 
H1, indicating that participants with higher cue utilisation demonstrated greater 
discrimination (M = 0.214, SD = 0.152), compared to participants with lower cue utilisation 
(M = 0.094, SD = 0.152).  
There was a statistically significant main effect of email exposure duration on 
participants’ discrimination scores, F(1, 122) = 11.91, p = .001, η2 = .089. This result 
supports H2, indicating that participants in the longer email exposure duration (M = 0.200, 
SD = 0.144), were better able to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails, 
compared to those in the shorter email exposure duration (M = 0.108, SD = 0.152). 
H3 was not supported, as there was no statistically significant interaction between the 
participants’ cue utilisation typology and the email exposure duration on their discrimination 
score, F(1, 122) = 0.353, p = .553. This result suggests that difference in ability to 
discriminate genuine from phishing emails between participants with a relatively higher and 
lower capacity for cue utilisation, was not affected by the email exposure duration. Therefore, 
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compared to participants in the longer email exposure duration, participants in the shorter 
email exposure duration did not have a significantly greater difference in discrimination 
scores between participants with a higher and lower capacity for cue utilisation. 
There was a statistically significant main effect of HAIS-Q score on discrimination 
scores, F(1, 122) = 8.425, p = .004, η2 = .065. This finding supports H4, demonstrating that 
higher level of ISA, as indicated by HAIS-Q scores, is associated with a greater ability to 






Figure 2. Participants’ marginal mean discrimination scores for the higher and lower cue 
utilisation typology, in the shorter and longer email exposure duration. All means are 
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An independent samples t-test was conducted to investigate whether participants in 
the two cue utilisation typologies differed in their HAIS-Q scores. Results indicated a 
statistically significant difference in HAIS-Q scores for the higher (M = 36.71, SD = .687) 
compared to the lower (M = 34.18, SD = .653) cue utilisation typology; t(125) = 2.661, p = 
.009. This result suggests that participants with a relatively higher level of cue utilisation had 
a higher level of ISA, compared to those with a relatively lower level of cue utilisation. 
Discussion 
Overview 
 The current experiment aimed to examine the main effects of time pressure, 
cue utilisation, and ISA on participants’ ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails. Cue utilisation, exposure time, and ISA were all found to be statistically significant 
predictors of discrimination ability. However, there was no statistically significant interaction 
between cue utilisation and exposure time. Cue utilisation was also found to be a statistically 
significant predictor of ISA.  
Individual Differences and Discrimination Ability 
Cue Utilisation and Discrimination Ability. H1 was supported, indicating that 
phishing cues present within illegitimate emails are more effectively accessed by individuals 
with a relatively higher level of cue utilisation. The effect size for this relationship was 
moderate, highlighting that cue utilisation is a relatively good predictor of phishing 
susceptibility.  
This result was predicted, as higher cue utilisation represents improved ability to 
apply environmental cues (Sturman et al., 2019a), and has been shown to distinguish between 
more-effective and less-effective operators in varied environments (Brouwers et al., 2016; 
Sturman et al., 2019a; 2019b; Yuris et al., 2019). Therefore, higher cue utilisation was 
expected to result in effective assessment of a phishing situation. This expands the cue 
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utilisation literature as phishing is affected by differences in cue utilisation and this individual 
difference can determine an individual’s phishing susceptibility.  
This differs from previous research which found higher levels of cue utilisation did 
not translate to improved discrimination ability (Bayl-Smith et al., 2020). This difference 
could be explained by the current experiment’s email stimuli. Stimuli in the present study 
encompassed a wide range of subject and email types, to represent email variety within a real 
inbox. These exactly replicated real-world emails, and functioned as expected, as participants 
had the ability to hover-over and display hyperlinks. These factors improved the ecological 
validity of the present experiment as email stimuli represented their real-world counterparts 
as closely as possible, allowing participants to respond as they would in a natural setting. 
Furthermore, in the previous study, emails contained multiple phishing cues, causing those 
stimuli to possibly be too easy to detect (Bayl-Smith et al., 2020). While the current 
experiment’s stimuli varied in number and type of cues, allowing for varied results. 
Information Security Awareness and Discrimination Ability. H4 was supported, 
indicating that participants with a higher score on the HAIS-Q, representing a higher level of 
ISA, had a greater ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine emails. This bolsters 
the previously established relationship between higher ISA and safe information security 
behaviours, as increased discrimination ability is an example of a safe information security 
behaviour.  
This result was expected, as ISA is an operationalisation of cyber-risk beliefs (Parsons 
et al., 2017) formed through previous experience, that are accessed when a relevant situation 
occurs (Griffin et al., 2002). The results demonstrate that these beliefs were more effectively 
accessed by individuals with higher levels of ISA. Moreover, higher levels of ISA have 
previously been linked to reduced information security breaches (Sohrabi Safa et al., 2016). 
Therefore, improved discrimination ability results in more efficient identification of phishing 
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emails, thus allowing for mitigation of such breaches. Previous research has demonstrated a 
relationship between higher ISA and detection of phishing links within emails (Parsons et al., 
2017). The current experiment expands this relationship to include other phishing cues, 
additionally, higher ISA results in improved discrimination ability.  
These findings strengthen the suggestion that the email-use focus area of the HAIS-Q 
can be used in a phishing context, separate from the rest of the questionnaire, and that the 
HAIS-Q can be used modularly (Parsons et al., 2017). Additionally, the HAIS-Q could be 
used in workplaces to identify individuals lacking in relevant knowledge, possessing a worse 
attitude, and potentially demonstrating unsafe information security behaviours.  
Cue Utilisation and Information Security Awareness. H5 was supported, 
indicating individuals with better self-reported knowledge, attitude, and behaviour regarding 
information security, will have an improved objective ability to discriminate between 
phishing and genuine cues within emails.  
This result was expected as greater knowledge of safe email-related information 
security behaviours will logically increase awareness of potential email phishing features. 
Previous results from the current experiment demonstrate higher levels of ISA result in better 
discrimination of environmental features, which is a necessary factor for cue utilisation 
(Wiggins, 2014a). Additionally, an understanding of the relatedness of features and events 
within operating environments, and the ability to prioritise correct features, are needed for 
cue utilisation (Wiggins, 2014a). Understanding of these factors will increase with 
knowledge of safe information security behaviours, resulting in better development of 
environmental cues and indicating a higher capacity for cue utilisation. Furthermore, these 
results indicate that safer self-reported information security behaviours translate to safer 
objectively measured behaviours in an operative environment. This provides a basis for 
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future research into the relationship between these two variables, wherein one could predict 
the other.  
Time Pressure and Discrimination Ability 
H2 was supported, indicating the shorter email exposure duration, which aimed to 
apply time pressure to participants, resulted in a reduced ability to discriminate between 
phishing and genuine emails compared to those exposed to the email for longer. This 
suggests increased time pressure necessitates faster, less deliberative decision making, 
resulting in worse discrimination ability. 
This was expected as novel or abnormal situational information necessitates the use of 
system 2 processing to reflect on system 1’s initial intuitions, to determine if a change in 
decision is needed (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Introducing time pressure may increase 
decision speed, possibly changing the decision mode and necessitating fast system 1 
processing that utilises cues (Allen, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2019; Kahneman, 2003). 
Previous research demonstrated habitual decision making, which is present in system 1, has 
caused increased phishing susceptibility (Vishwanath et al., 2011). Furthermore, a systematic 
review demonstrated that time pressure reduced safe cybersecurity behaviours in several 
contexts (Chowdhury et al., 2019). Therefore, an abnormal email feature may have been 
noticed, initiating the use of system 2, but this process was interrupted by the short time limit 
in the short email exposure duration, changing the decision mode and reducing discrimination 
ability. 
Alternatively, participants may not have been able to identify all critical features 
within the email in the allocated time. Consequently, participants may not be changing the 
way the decision is made in the shorter email exposure duration, but instead the accessible 
information is reduced, and a decision is forced. In either case, this result emphasizes the 
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need to reduce situational time pressure placed upon email-users, to reduce the number of 
people victimised by phishing attacks. 
Chowdhury et al. (2019) identified three time pressure forms used in cyber-security 
literature; explicit, implicit, and self-referred. Explicit refers to a deadline being placed upon 
participants, while implicit implies this without explicitly enforcing a time limit. Self-referred 
time pressure involves a self-report of perceived time pressure, and the resultant 
consequences. The current experiment demonstrates the effect of explicit time pressure; 
however, future research could compare this to other identified forms, to determine 
differences in influence on discrimination ability. 
Interaction between Cue Utilisation and Time Pressure on Discrimination Ability 
H3 was not supported, indicating the difference in discrimination ability between 
relatively higher and lower cue utilisation individuals, was not affected by the email exposure 
duration. Relatively higher cue utilisation participants were expected to assess and apply cues 
within the emails at a faster rate than those with a relatively lower level (Sturman et al., 
2019a). Moreover, higher cue utilisation would be more advantageous for participants in the 
shorter email exposure duration, as time pressure may result in reliance on cue-based intuitive 
decision making (Allen, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2019; Kahneman, 2003). Thus, resulting in 
a greater difference in discrimination ability between higher and lower cue utilisation 
participants under time pressure, as higher cue utilisation participants could complete this 
process within the time limit.  
However, this difference in discrimination ability between higher and lower cue 
utilisation individuals when under time pressure was not greater than when time pressure is 
reduced. Therefore, possessing higher levels of cue utilisation is not just advantageous when 
under time pressure but is beneficial when given longer to examine emails. This demonstrates 
that advantages associated with cue utilisation are not merely due to information processing 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY 32 
 
speed, but increased effectiveness of processing producing better decisions when time 
pressure is reduced. 
Furthermore, the longer email exposure duration (15 seconds) may, for some 
participants, still represent time pressure. Future research could include a wider range of 
email exposure durations, to determine whether an alternative duration may reveal a 
difference. Alternatively, including a no-time-pressure condition to examine whether cue 
utilisation continues to be advantageous when a decision can be made without a time limit. 
Otherwise, an unidentified factor could have resulted in participants within the shorter email 
exposure duration to have better than expected discrimination ability.  
Implications of the Findings 
The findings suggest reducing time pressure may reduce phishing susceptibility and 
improve cybersecurity behaviours. Consequently, workplaces could introduce interventions 
aiming to inform individuals of the risks associated with assessing emails while under time 
pressure. Policies could be enacted that reduce the number of received emails, allowing more 
time to review potentially illegitimate emails.  
Furthermore, governmental awareness campaigns focusing on phishing could inform 
individuals about the dangers of time pressure and upon improving discrimination ability, 
instead of increasing bias towards risk-averse behaviour. A clear distinction should be made, 
as bias towards risk-averse behaviour causes genuine emails to be considered suspicious 
(Falkenberg et al., 2019), while improved discrimination will reduce these false alarms.   
These results support the use of EXPERTise within workplaces to identify individuals 
with greater phishing susceptibility, improving the efficiency of workplace training 
allocation. This was an inaugural examination of the relationship between time pressure and 
discrimination ability, providing a basis for future research in this area. This experiment 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND PHISHING SUSCEPTIBILITY 33 
 
bolsters the existing phishing literature regarding individual differences, providing a possible 
design to be adapted and further applied.  
Strengths 
This experiment’s design, whereby participants were unaware the task was examining 
responses to phishing emails, is novel in phishing research examining individual differences. 
The design aimed to make the email assessment process as close as possible to how 
participants would assess their own emails, whilst remaining experimental. The roleplay 
aspect helped ensure participants remained unaware of the phishing-related nature, reduced 
subject-expectancy bias and added context to the categorisation decisions. Furthermore, the 
email stimuli exactly replicated real received emails and encompassed a large range of email 
and subject types. The large stimuli sample allowed the phishing to genuine email ratio to be 
akin to a real inbox while producing sufficient data points. Moreover, as the experiment was 
online, it remained closer to a natural email answering environment, allowing for similar 
distractions.  
All these aspects lent ecological validity to the experiment; thus, increasing 
generalisability of the results. Similar role-play designs have been used previously (Parsons 
et al., 2015; 2019), and the current experiment follows suggestions for a large and diverse (in 
content) email sample (Parsons et al., 2015). Previous studies have involved sending crafted 
phishing emails to the real inbox of unknowing participants (Parsons et al., 2015), and while 
these provide useful indications of response rates, generalisability is reduced as only one 
email type can be sent. Moreover, the large participant sample recruited from student and 
public sources allowed for responses from a varied set of individuals, resulting in a wide age-
range of participants. This furthered result generalisability, increased statistical power, and 
decreased the likelihood of type II errors, allowing more valid results to be produced.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
This experiment’s time pressure conditions aimed to replicate time pressure that 
individuals may experience when responding to multiple emails each day. This manipulation 
was necessary to maintain experimental control and ensure study length did not extend 
beyond feasibility. However, it is unclear whether participants used all allocated time to 
assess the emails. For instance, participants in the 15 second condition may have only used 
10 seconds to assess the email. Consequently, this manipulation may not capture real world 
responses, where individuals are free to vary the email assessment time. For example, an 
individual may quickly determine an email is genuine and not phishing but may require 
several minutes to determine whether a potential phishing email is phishing. Future research 
could include naturalistic experimental conditions where unlimited time is given to assess and 
categorise emails. Alternatively, participants could be given a block of time to classify 
multiple emails. 
Future uses of a similar experimental design may benefit from including an open-
ended question as a check near the study’s conclusion, ensuring participants have not realised 
the true nature of the study. This would allow responses where participants realised the study 
was examining phishing to be identified and not included, to avoid invalid data. Additionally, 
a lab-based version of this experiment could be conducted, allowing examination of 
outcomes when potential variances are further controlled. This may also allow the studies 
length to be increased. 
As time pressure is a novel variable to consider in conjunction with phishing 
susceptibility, future research could attempt to determine which individual differences best 
lessen its effects. Training could be designed aiming to teach individuals how to best 
minimise email assessment errors and minimise time pressure’s effect by increasing email 
assessment efficiency. A wider variety of time pressure conditions could be examined, i.e. a 
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low, high, and no-time-pressure context, to determine differences when reducing, compared 
to removing, time pressure.  
Conclusion 
The current study aimed to further the understanding of how time pressure, cue 
utilisation, and ISA influence the ability to discriminate between phishing and genuine 
emails. Time pressure was found to result in poorer discrimination ability. Furthermore, a 
relatively higher level of cue utilisation and a higher level of ISA resulted in improved 
discrimination ability. These two individual differences were found to be positively 
associated with each other. However, no interaction was found between cue utilisation and 
time pressure on discrimination ability. Future research is required to further examine these 
relationships to determine who is most at risk of phishing attacks, and how to minimise errors 
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